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Id. at 2648. Thus, the statements were
not testimonial. Id. at 2649.
However, the Court concluded that
when Muniz was asked whether he
knew the date of his sixth birthday, he
was confronted with the cruel trilemma
in a coercive environment created by
the custodial interrogation. Id. Since his
answer was testimonial, it should have
been suppressed.
The Court then addressed the State's
argument that the initial questioning
period did not constitute custodial interrogation or its "functional equivalent."
Id. at 2650. In Rbode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court
defined the "functional equivalent" of
interrogation as "any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. Finding that
custodial interrogation did exist, it nonetheless held Muniz's answers regarding
name, address, weight, eye color, date of
birth, and current age admissible as falling within the newly adopted "routine
booking" exception, established in
United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180
(8th Cir. 1989), which exempts questions to secure the information necessary to complete booking or pretrial
services. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
Muniz made additional statements
while performing three sobriety tests
and while deciding not to take a breathalyzer test. Yet, the Court noted, the
statements were made in response to
carefully scripted instructions not intended to elicit any verbal responses. Id.
at 2651. Therefore, the officer's words
or actions did not constitute interrogation and even the questions requesting a
response were merely "attendant to"
legitimate police procedure. Id. Hence,
Muniz's statements were made voluntarilyand thus were admissible. Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a
concurring opinion, agreed that the
statements made when the accused was
asked the date of his sixth birthday,
should not have been suppressed. This
result was premised on the grounds that
if the police may require Muniz to use
his body in order to demonstrate the
level of his physical coordination, they
should be able to require him to speak
or write in order to determine mental
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coordination.Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C.
J., concurring). Rehnquist disagreed
with the recognition of a routine booking exception to Miranda. He felt the
"booking" questions were not testimonial so there was no need to apply the
privilege. Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C. ).,
concurring).
Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter,
agreed with the majority that Muniz's
response to the question regarding the
date of his sixth birthday should have
been suppressed as the question constituted custodial interrogation prior to
receipt of Miranda warnings. Id.(Marshall,}., dissenting). He disagreed, however, with the recognition of the routine
booking exception and believed the
Court had misapplied the Innis test
when considering custodial interrogation.Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall,}., dissenting). Marshall believed the routine
booking exception would necessitate
difficult, time consuming litigation over
whether particular questions were routine, necessary for recordkeeping and
designed to elicit incriminating testimony. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It is apparent that the Supreme Court
will continue their conservative outlook
with regard to drunk driving prosecutions. As illustrated by this case, if evidence is not obtained by way of custodial interrogation or falls within the
routine booking exception to Miranda,
the courts will allow evidence obtained
by way of videotape.
- Freddie] Traub

Wi/Iiams v. Wi/zack: MARYLAND
STATUTE ALLOWING
INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
ME NT ALLY ILL PATIENTS TO
BE FORCIBLY MEDICATED
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
In Williams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485,
573 A.2d 809 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that § 10-708
of the Maryland Health-General Article,
which established procedures for medicating mentally ill patients against their
will, lacked the requisite procedural
due process protections guaranteed by
the state and federal constitutions. Although the decision did not render the
statute unconstitutional, it potentially
did weaken the ability of psychiatrists to
forcibly medicate possibly dangerous

patients, even if such medication is
approved by a clinical review panel.
Laquinn Williams was committed to a
state mental hospital after a judicial
determination that he was not criminally responsible. See Md. Health-Gen.
Code Ann. § 12-108 (1990). After Williams was diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic, his doctor prescribed treatment with an antipsychotic drug. Williams objected to taking the medication
for fear it would disrupt his thought
process, interfere with the exercise of
his Sunni Muslim religion, and reduce
his ability to assist his attorney in a subsequent release hearing. Id. at 490,573
A.2d at 811. A clinical review panel was
convened to review William's decision.
Williams and his lawyer were allowed to
be present for part of the hearing so that
Williams could explain his reasons for
objecting. The panel, however, unanimously determined that the medication
was the least intrusive way to effectively
treat Williams and ordered that he be
forcibly medicated. Id. at 490,573 A.2d
at 811. Williams was medicated against
his will for approximately two weeks
until he stated his plans to obtain an
injunction to prohibit the medication.
The medication was, therefore, temporarily discontinued and another review
panel was convened. This second review
panel also unanimously recommended
that Williams be forcibly medicated. Id.
at 491,573 A.2d at 812.
Williams filed an action in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County alleging
that the procedures under § 10-708 violated his state and federal constitutional
rights to privacy, due process, freedom
of speech, thought, and religion. Id. The
trial court determined that § 10-708 was
both constitutional on its face and as
applied. As such, the court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment
and denied William's motion for partial
summary judgment. Williams appealed,
and the court of appeals granted certiorari before the court of special appeals
decided the case. Id. at 492, 573 A.2d at
812.
The court of appeals initially explained that without § 10-708, the common law rule as set forth in Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014
( 1977) would apply. The Sard rule
required that a physician obtain a patient's consent before he treated a patient in a non-emergency situation. Wil-

Iiams, 319 Md. at 494,573 A.2d at 814
(citingSard, 281 Md. at 439,379 A.2d at
1014).
Next, the court looked at each applicable health statute in detail, noting
their procedural and substantive due
process requirements. Williams argued
that § 10-708 did not provide for proper
notice, the right to attend the meeting,
the right to a written decision, or the
right to an appeal. Id. at 492,573 A.2d at

813.

In answering in the affirmative, the
Court held that the state had a rational
basis for administering the drugs to the
inmates, regardless of their displeasure.
Williams, 319 Md. at 499, 573 A.2d at
816.
It found that, substantively, the state's
administrative policy was a "rational
means of furthering the state's legitimate objectives of administering drugs
for treatment purposes under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist." Id. at
502, 573 A.2d at 817 (citing Harper,
110 S. Ct. at 1042). Procedurally, the
Court stated that nothing in the Constitution prohibited the state from permitting medical personnel to make that
decision "under fair procedural mechanisms." Id. at 503, 573 A.2d at 818 (citing Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042).
Although the court of appeals noted
that Williams was not a prisoner in a
penal institution, as was the patient in
Harper, it stated that Harper set forth
procedural due process guidelines for
determining whether Williams' constitutional rights were violated. Id., at 508,
573 A.2d at 820. The court concluded
that because § 10-708 did not provide
Williams with notice of the final review
proceeding, or the ability to present
evidence, or the ability to cross examine
witnesses, it did not afford the requisite
procedural due process protections to
which Williams was entitled. Id. at 50910,573 A.2d at 821.
The court ruled, therefore, that it was
error to enter summary judgment against
Williams, and it was error to deny Williams' motion for partial summary judgment. Consequently, the court held that
the common law rule, as set forth in
Sard v. Hardy, requiring a patient's consent before the administration of such
drugs, applied in William's case. Id. at
510,573 A.2d at 821 (citingSard, 281
Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 1014).
The court of appeals concluded that
additional procedural due process protections were owed to Williams even
though the Supreme Court, in Harper,
specifically did not require such protections. In so holding, it is obvious that the
Maryland court wished to give involuntarily committed individuals additional guarantees of due process protection above and beyond what the Supreme
Court required.

Eanes v. State: RESTRICTIONS ON
THE VOLUME LEVEL OF
PROTECTED SPEECH HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL
In Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569
A.2d 604 (1990), the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a statute limiting
the volume level of protected speech
does not violate the first amendment to
the United States Constitution
While speaking against abortion in
front of the Hagerstown Reproductive
Clinic ("Clinic"), Jerry Wayne Eanes
("Eanes") made no threat of violence,
no effort to physically restrain those
entering the Clinic, and made no attempt
to block access to the Clinic. Eanes, 318
Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606. Additionally, Eanes did not use obsenity, profanity or attempt to incite violence. Eanes
spoke without artificial amplification,
yet, was alleged to have spoken so loudly
that he was heard above the noise
generated by traffic. Throughout the
day, local residents and people employed
in the vicinity made several complaints
to the local police regarding the loudness of Eanes' speech. Id.
After the police department had received numerous complaints concerning the volume level of the demonstrator, the police warned Eanes to lower
his voice. Eanes ignored the warning
and was arrested for disturbing the
peace in violation of Md. Ann. Code art.
27, § 121 (1989). Section 121 makes it
unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb
any neighborhood in [any Maryland]
city, town or county by loud and unseemly noises." Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
121 (1989). Eanes was found guilty in
the District Court of Maryland for Washington County. Eanes, 318 Md. at 442,
569 A.2d at 607.
On appeal, Eanes, citing Diebl v. State,
294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 US. 1098 (1983), contended that only speech not protected
by the first amendment was subject to a
statutory prohibition against "loud and
unseemly noises." Eanes, 318 Md. at
443, 569 A.2d at 607. The court, disagreed with Eanes' interpretation, and
explained that the prohibition against
"loud and unseemly noises" in Diehl
sought to regulate objectionable content of speech. Whereas in Eanes, the
court pointed out, it was the volume
level which was objectionable, not the

After addressing the applicable health
statutes, the court focused upon the
Supreme Court cases of Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 US. 307 (1982) and Washington v. Hatper, 11 0 S. Ct. 1028 ( 1990).
The court used these cases to support
the rationale that due process considerations could be satisfied if professional
judgment was used to override the patient's objections. Williams, 319 Md. at
495, 573 A.2d at 813.
Although Youngberg did not deal
with forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs, the case did address what
rights a person involuntarily committed
to a state institution possessed under
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court in Youngberg
concluded that such an individual could
be restrained to the extent deemed
necesary by the medical profession. Williams, 310 Md. at 497, 573 A.2d at 814
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 324). In
reaching this decision, the Supreme
Court stated "it was necessary to balance the liberty of the individual and the
demands of an organized society." Id. at
495, 573 A.2d at 814, (citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 320). Specifically, the
court reasoned that although the committed individual possessed certain
rights, the state also had legitimate reasons for restraining a committed individual's liberty. Id.
Additionally, the Supreme Court
stated that deference should be given to
the decisions made by the medical staff
of an institution in that judges and juries
were not better qualified than medical
professionals in determining which procedures best protect an individual's liberty interests. Id. at 496,573 A.2d 814
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 322-23).
Unlike Youngberg, the recently decided case of Harper deals specifically
with whether a state had the right to
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs
- Kathleen Dunivin Scbmitt
to an involuntarily committed prisoner.
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